The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics

By Roger A. Pielke Jr.
Cambridge: CUP 2007
RRP: £20.99 (pb)
ISBN: 9780521694810

Reviewed by Matt James

At the final conference of the ESRC’s Genomics Network Conference in April earlier this year I heard Roger Pielke Jr speak on ‘The many roles of scientific advice for governance and society’. It was the first time that I had encountered Pielke and found his ideas on science in society and democracy fascinating. A professor in the Environmental Studies Program and Fellow of the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Science (CIRES), University of Colorado, Pielke’s background is in mathematics, public policy and political science. For many years now he has been particularly engaged in the science and policy of climate change.

It was with this heightened awareness and appreciation of his ideas that I picked up a copy of Pielke’s book “The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics”. Published in 2007 by CUP the book is in its eighth printing already and seems to have made a lasting contribution to the field of science and technology studies (STS).

Structure and format

What strikes you most about the book is the incredible ease with which Pielke writes. The book is very well structured and consists of nine highly accessible chapters covering issues of values, uncertainty, democracy and the politicising of science. He clearly sets out the focus of each chapter at the start and helps to summarise and condense the chapter’s key points in recap sections at the end. This accessible format is helpful in identifying key points and sections of the book. While it is clear the book is the result of deliberative and focused study, the format of each chapter leads me to question whether this book emerged from a series of talks. A rich bibliography is also included which is a great spring board for further study and engagement on the topic.

Framework for engagement

Clear and methodical are two adjectives which describe well Pielke’s book. At the heart of the book is the author’s aim of setting out a framework for scientists to use when they are engaging in public decision making and for identifying how best to engage with policy conversations. This makes the book useful primarily for scientists of all disciplines which use the term ‘science’ in their titles; a point which the author is keen to make. Social scientists can learn as much from the book as those scientists working in the broad fields of biology, chemistry and physics. But this is not to say that only scientists of one variety or another will enjoy the book. Other disciplines as well as the general public should read and engage with Pielke’s ideas as they have direct relevance to them as well.

In applying his proposed framework Pielke believes will help to prepare the way towards improvements in policy development and the way in which science and politics interact. But is the drive to be clear and methodical not only the book’s strength but also its weakness? There is much to learn from the book and much that has helped me to better understand and appreciate the interplay between science, politics and policy. But sadly there remains a gnawing feeling at the back of my mind that, aside from the well presented case studies, life ain’t so simple as Pielke presents it to be!

Given that I am someone who particularly appreciates a simple but well developed diagram which helps to communicate key themes and ideas, Pielke ticks this box by summarising the key messages of his book into a diagram. The author’s recommendations and argument hinge on a useful two–by–two matrix. On the horizontal axis are two views of science that potential policy advisers may hold to; namely the linear model and the stakeholder model. With the linear model, knowledge is considered a prerequisite for action and should sometimes compel policy. In contrast, the stakeholder model adopts the perspective that policy–relevant science must be made in reference to values and consideration of both the user and the application of the science.

Along the vertical axis represents the views of democracy held by potential advisers. At one end we have interest–group pluralism, where adviser places their knowledge in the service of special interests. In contrast to this is what others have termed guided democracy, whereby experts use their specialist knowledge in order to clarify policy choices and to inform decision makers of the range of options open to them. As I read the book a personal example came to mind of the former UK Government Scientific Adviser, Sir David King, who I heard speak about his involvement in advising Prime Minister Blair on the foot and mouth crisis of 2001. From listening to King and reading Pielke, it would appear that King assumed a guided democracy approach with Blair.

On the basis of this two–by–two matrix, the author establishes four theoretically possible advisory roles: pure scientist, issue advocate, science arbiter and honest broker of policy alternatives. In an example of the clarity with which the author is able to communicate and present his ideas, Pielke makes use of the illustration of a tourist visiting a new city they have not visited before and seeking advice as to where the best restaurant is to dine, in comparison to the four different advisory roles. The pure scientist might simply give the visitor information about the characteristics of a healthy diet, where as a science arbiter would act more as a concierge who is ready to answer any questions the visitor might have. Alternatively, an issue advocate, might try to direct the visitor to a particular restaurant, while the honest broker would act more like a ‘Lonely Planet’ guide, providing information on all restaurants, thereby expanding the tourist’s scope of choice for them to make the final decision.

Refreshingly the author presents a balanced approach to our four theoretically roles and does not argue for one over the other. However, given the title of the book, the role of honest broker is definitely a role the author supports. It is therefore perhaps fair to assert that Pielke’s argument is that scientists should try and assume the role of honest broker more often than they currently do. That it is not to say that they are always honest brokers, Pielke gives past examples of successful instances of advisor assuming one of the other three roles. What Pielke is arguing against here is for the default norm to be issue advocates driven by a linear model. In many respects the author is calling for greater transparency in approach. He has a disdain for those advisors who assume advocacy positions with politically vested interests, without admitting to themselves or others that this is what they are doing. I have a similar disdain and so empathise with Pielke’s approach. Nevertheless, simplicity does set in at key points of which I will expand upon later.

To develop his ideas further, Pielke proposes a thought experiment distinguishing between “Tornado Politics” and “Abortion Politics.” Imagine that you are in an auditorium with 50 other people when someone runs in and exclaims that a tornado is fast approaching. The group must decide what to do – do you take refuge in the basement or not? Stage two is to imagine the exact same group in the exact same auditorium but faced with the question of whether or not to permit the practice of abortion in their community. Each scenario ends with the same key question: “What should we do?”.

The author refers to the two stages of the thought experiment as examples of two forms of politics. First, Tornado Politics: situations where a consensus on values exists (“we must escape this approaching tornado”) so that the focus becomes a systematic search of new knowledge in order that scientific uncertainties are reduced which leads to a legitimate decision.

In cases where the consensus is perceived to be lacking from both a scientific and political response and therefore “no” is the answer to the first question, Pielke refers to this kind of scenario as Abortion Politics: situations where value disputes cannot be resolved by reducing scientific uncertainties. Adding to the scientific knowledge base will not help resolve the situation and allow protagonists and antagonists to agree. In this kind of context, the challenge for scientists is to either expand or reduce the range of policy options. If they pursue this they assume the role of issue advocates and thereby align themselves with a particular political agenda or interest group. If they choose to expand the range of options, they become honest brokers, helping to clarify existing policy options as well as identifying new options.

Based on this understanding Pielke asserts that scientists get into trouble when they treat abortion politics as tornado politics. Two issues arise. First, political preferences enter into the scientific debate ‘undercover’ and help to block consensus and politicises science. Second, the linear model of tornado politics shuts down other avenues of thought and ideas at a time when the drive should be on opening up and broadening the range of options.

While I am attracted to much of what Pielke writes and want to agree, I fear that there is a disparity between the theoretical and the practical. This can be summarised in two words Change and Clarity.

First, change. As we learn, perspectives and opinions can change. It’s not that profound but nonetheless true! Political engagement changes as we grow in understanding and knowledge of a particular issue meaning that “abortion politics” could change to “tornado politics” and vice versa. Pielke does not seem to pick up on this or recognise it.

Second, clarity. I agree with Pielke that there is need for opening up the range of options in policy discussions and that more space should be given to do this. But it strikes me that there must also come a point when the options are then limited and refined in order to then reach consensus and agreement. Jasonhoff has already highlighted the example of the 1984 Warnock Committee here in the UK which helped to establish the 14–day limit on embryo research. Research on an embryo can only be carried out up to 14 days, beyond the 14 days it is not permissible. While some may have still disagreed with the outcome, a negotiated, knowledge–based consensus was nonetheless established, upon which helped to shape particular policy decisions and depoliticise value conflicts.

It is clear that Piekle finds a liner model lacking in that more knowledge does not necessarily help to resolve and end conflicts but helps contribute to greater instances of uncertainty. Furthermore, value conflicts can often be resolved without the introduction of new science being introduced into the mix. But it appears Piekle may have failed to grasp the full extent of the broader critique of the linear model. Rather than adopting a full sanitisation of science so that it neither restrains nor compels policy, as Piekle appears to advocate, the main critique of the linear model concerns more the tendency amongst scientists to take for granted values and social preferences that are often embedded in the internal workings of science. As such, methodologies employed by the science community are not subject to any sense of accountability or external scrutiny as it is not seen to be necessary.

I found The Honest Broker to be a thrilling and informative book. Many times I found my own thoughts and opinions resonating with those of the author. The book aims to challenge and bring some new perspectives to the important interrelationship of science, politics and policy. I admire Piekle’s idea of the honest broker and think that it has much to offer, but I think there is a key element missing due in part because the book attempts too much. In focusing on science, it perhaps overlooks the contribution of other disciplines and the need for a multidisciplinary exchange. While the principles outlined in the book are in large part transferable to other disciplines, the predominant focus on science means that science is seen to have all the answers. We do need more honest brokers in policy development but honest brokers, in this case, of the scientific alternatives. Science has an important and crucial role to play. In turn these scientific alternatives need to be offered and shared in humility with fellow honest brokers from other disciplines.

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